Alaska Supreme Court Issues Stay of Forced Medication

Jim Gottstein passes along this order issued by the Alaska Supreme Court on Friday. The key passage:

There is at least implicit disagreement in this case about whether administration of psychotropic medication causes medical health problems that are potentially grave or whether itmay even contribute to mental illness. At least by implication, the involuntary administration ofmedication against appellant's fervent wishes may cause psychic harm, Whether long~term administration ofsuch medication causes irreparable harm is an issue that implicates the merits of this appeal. The evidence appellant produced at the mid-May hearing permits a conclusion long-term medication will cause him irreparable harm. It also appears to imply that even the administration of a single dose, or an additional dose, intravenously may contribute to irreparable harm. The 5/20 affidavit of Dr. Jackson does not seem to expressly address the harm that might result from a single fifty-milligram intravenous injection of Risperadone. But it also appears that the likelihood the medication will end with the proposed injection authorized 5/19/08 by the superior court is small. Appellant has been admitted seventy-five times to API. It is likely that ifhe is released with or without medication (his thirty-day commitment order was entered 5/5108), he will be readmitted to API in the future and that API staff will again seek a medication order. Thus, if the medication is administered as presently authorized, it seems likely that he will sooner or later following return to the community decline to voluntarily accept medication and that API will seek permission to administer additional doses. In other words, whether irreparable harm will result from the medication authorized by the 5/19 order necessarily raises longer-term questions.

API asserts that its interests cannot be adequately protected. It certainly has an important interest in fulfilling its duty to patients and in satisfYing its charter obligations to the public. But the evidence to date does not establish that medication is necessary to protect appellant from self-inflicted harm or from retaliatory harm in response to his behavior, threatening as it may seem to others. Nor has API identified any need to protect others from him, including API staff during his commitment or the public upon his release. This is not to minimize API's interest both in doing what it believes best for appellant and in carrying out its responsibilities. But it does not appear that API cannot adequately protect those interests. API's interest in protecting appellant does not dramatically outweigh his desire to make treatment decisions for himself, It therefore appears that the appropriate standard for a stay pending appeal is whether appellant has raised serious and substantial questions going to the merits ofthe case. He does not have to demonstrate a clear showing of probable success on the merits.