Disability Law Book Club: Boris & Klein on Home Health Workers
Labels: Book Club, Recent Scholarship
Periodic updates on developments in disability law and related fields.
Labels: Book Club, Recent Scholarship
Labels: Title II, Transportation
Zurale Cali, a Florida mother, is fighting to bring her special needs, 5-year-old son home from a place, she says, he should have never been placed: a nursing home.
Now, she and hundreds of other families in a similar situation have filed a class-action lawsuit against the state in hopes of receiving the proper home care they say their children deserve: 24-hour nursing care at home.
Labels: Community Treatment, Olmstead
In consideration of the comments received, we are not finalizing the setting provisions of proposed §441.530 at this time. The comments received indicated to us that the proposed provisions caused more confusion and disagreement than clarity and we believe further discussion and consideration on this issue is necessary. In addition, similar language proposed in the notice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to the 1915(c) waiver program garnered significant public comment. Therefore, we intend to issue a new proposed regulation that will provide setting criteria for CFC that we developed in light of the comments received and to invite additional public comment on our proposal. We plan to propose home and community-based settings shall have all of the following qualities, and such other qualities as the Secretary determines to be appropriate, based on the needs of the individual as indicated in their person-centered service plan:
● The setting is integrated in, and facilitates the individual’s full access to, the greater community, including opportunities to seek employment and work in competitive integrated settings, engage in community life, control personal resources, and receive services in the community, in the same manner as individuals without disabilities;
● The setting is selected by the individual from among all available alternatives and is identified in the person-centered service plan;
● An individual’s essential personal rights of privacy, dignity and respect, and freedom from coercion and restraint are protected;
● Individual initiative, autonomy, and independence in making life choices, including but not limited to, daily activities, physical environment, and with whom to interact are optimized and not regimented;
● Individual choice regarding services and supports, and who provides them, is facilitated.;
● In a provider-owned or controlled residential setting, the following additional conditions must be met. Any modification of the conditions, for example, to address the
safety needs of an individual with dementia, must be supported by a specific assessed need and documented in the person-centered service plan:
++ The unit or room is a specific physical place that can be owned, rented or occupied under another legally enforceable agreement by the individual receiving services, and the individual has, at a minimum, the same responsibilities and protections from eviction that tenants have under the landlord tenant law of the State, county, city or other designated entity;We also plan to propose that home and community-based settings do not include
++ Each individual has privacy in their sleeping or living unit:
-- Units have lockable entrance doors, with appropriate staff having keys to doors;
--Individuals share units only at the individual’s choice; and
--Individuals have the freedom to furnish and decorate their sleeping or living units;
++ Individuals have the freedom and support to control their own schedules and activities, and have access to food at any time;
++ Individuals are able to have visitors of their choosing at any time; and
++ The setting is physically accessible to the individual.
the following:
1) A nursing facility;While we are proposing the aforementioned setting requirements in a new proposed rule, the CFC option is in full effect. CMS will rely on the proposed setting provision as we review new 1915(k) State plan options and we will fully expect States to comply with the setting requirements and design and implement the benefit accordingly. To the extent there are changes when this language is finalized, we are committed to permitting States with an approved section 1915(k) State plan amendment a reasonable transition period, at a minimum of one year, to make any needed program changes to come into compliance with the final setting requirements. We are committed to minimizing disruption to State systems that have been established based upon compliance with these proposed regulations.
2) An institution for mental diseases;
3) An intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded;
4) A hospital providing long-term care services; or
5) Any other locations that have qualities of an institutional setting, as determined
by the Secretary. The Secretary will apply a rebuttable presumption that a setting is not a home and community-based setting, and engage in heightened scrutiny, for any setting that is located in a building that is also a publicly or privately operated facility that provides inpatient institutional treatment in a building on the grounds of, or immediately adjacent to, a public institution or disability-specific housing complex. CMS will engage States in discussion and review any pertinent information submitted during the SPA review process to determine if these facilities meet the HCBS qualities set forth in the proposed rule.
It is our intent to and to apply this criteria to sections 1915(c) and 1915(i) of the Act authorities.
As expressed earlier, we believe further discussion is necessary and we believe this can be accomplished by soliciting public comments on the modified criteria. Therefore, we are not finalizing the setting provision at this time.
Labels: Community Treatment, Medicaid Act, Olmstead
Labels: Public Accommodations, Title III
A legally blind athlete is suing three triathlon groups over a rule that makes him and other vision-impaired runners wear blackout glasses -- leaving them temporarily sightless -- in a controversial effort to "level the playing field.''
The lawsuit was filed Wednesday in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan by Aaron Scheidies, a 30-year-old athlete. Scheidies says the rule violates the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Having a legally blind person compete in the running portion of a triathlon with blackout glasses "poses substantial danger to not only the competitor but those around them,'' the complaint says.As I read the article, the folks who host the triathlon rank blind competitors separately from all other competitors. They require anyone with limited vision who wishes to be ranked in the blind category to wear black-out glasses so that everyone ranked in that category has the same level of vision. (Again, that's just my understanding from reading the article and complaint. I'd be interested to hear more if my understanding is wrong.) What's not clear to me from the article and complaint is whether Scheidies wants to be ranked in the blind category, despite his residual vision, without wearing the black-out glasses, or whether the triathlon administrators will totally bar him from the race if he does not wear those glasses. If it's the latter, that would seem pretty clearly to be a violation of the law. If it's the former, the case is much harder, even though the policy would still seem to me an ignorant one that should be abandoned.
Labels: Public Accommodations, Sports, Title III
Advocates for employees with disabilities said new guidelines on discrimination in the workplace from the U.S. Equal Employment Commission are being delayed by political opposition from business.
The agency abruptly deleted the proposal today from the agenda for a meeting, a week after business groups led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce pressed the Obama administration to block the guidelines.Ah, election year!
Labels: EEOC, Employment
Labels: Class Actions, Public Accommodations, Title III
Although we agree with the district court that Daniels was required to state a plausible allegation that there is a likelihood that he will suffer future harm, we disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Daniels’ allegations are insufficient. Daniels alleged that he “intends to continue to visit the [Market] in the future for his shopping needs.” We must accept this allegation as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, and we deem the allegation plausible because Daniels resides in relatively close proximity to the Market.
The district court found Daniels’ statement that he intends to return to the market implausible for two reasons. First, the district court held that Daniels’ failure to provide exact dates that he visited the Market in the past, and a more specific time at which he intends to visit the Market in the future, demonstrated the absence of a reasonable likelihood that he would return. However, we are aware of no precedent in this Circuit that requires this degree of specificity to survive a motion to dismiss, and we decline to impose such a requirement here.
Second, the district court held that Daniels’ litigation history “undermine[d]” his statements concerning his intention to return to the Market. However, we are not faced with the issue here whether a party’s extensive litigation history may be used to determine the plausibility of his alleged future intentions, because Daniels’ litigation history is scant and, thus, cannot have served to undermine his allegations. As the district court observed, Daniels was a party to two lawsuits raising claims of ADA violations in Maryland. There is no indication in the record that either of these two lawsuits was held to have been frivolous.
“The right to sue and defend in the courts . . . is one of the highest and most essential privileges of citizenship . . . [and] is granted and protected by the Federal Constitution.” Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). Absent a determination that Daniels has abused those privileges, we will not hold his past participation in the judicial process against him. Accordingly, we conclude that Daniels’ litigation history is not relevant to this case.
Labels: Appellate Cases, Public Accommodations, Title III
One successful ADA lawyer, Martin Coleman, puts it bluntly: “As a private attorney, every lawsuit that I file is to make money, because that’s how I make a living. . . . And in that regard, I’m no different than any other private attorney.”
My gripe is not with Mr. Coleman, but with the legal system that authorizes this type of litigation in the first place. The lawyers behind the ADA scheme claim that their private enforcement beefs up public enforcement. But private lawsuits need not be aligned with social welfare. Indeed, in this instance, they work at cross purposes. Lawyers like Mr. Coleman march to the incentives the ADA creates for them. They don’t know and don’t care that these capital expenditures produce little to no social benefit. Indeed, if there had been any perceptible need for the changes demanded in such lawsuits, some regular customer would have sued long ago.Thanks to Michael Stein for the pointer.
Labels: EEOC, Employment
Federal officials have notified advocates for the physically disabled that efforts to get Gov. Sam Brownback’s administration to address long-standing waiting lists for services have been unsuccessful.
As a result, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has turned the case over to the U.S. Department of Justice.
“We were told Friday afternoon,” said Shannon Jones, executive director at the Statewide Independent Living Council of Kansas. “I’m not surprised by the decision, but I am disappointed that it’s had to go this far. This is about 3,400 people who’ve been lingering and suffering on waiting lists for one, two and three years.”
Labels: Community Treatment, Olmstead
My caregiving job emphasized community integration, so I took people on lots of walks and transit outings in different neighborhoods in the Portland area. When that’s the crux of your work, you learn pretty quickly which sidewalks are passable and which are just slightly overgrown with hedges; you learn which sidewalks have appropriate curb cuts and which sections of the neighborhood are better traversed right on the street. You learn whose wheelchair will fit on the bus and whose won’t.
And you learn which businesses are accessible and which are not. Obviously, you avoid the latter. Planning dates — and these days, planning my own forays into the community — requires a similar, but different, set of calculations about what’s accessible and what isn’t.
What I’m getting at is that if you write that no one is being hurt by a lack of accessibility, you’re right, but only because the ambulance chaser analogy and framing is fundamentally flawed. That people with disabilities are in many cases more likely to accept segregation than to seek out — and attempt to access — businesses they know aren’t going to be accessible for them doesn’t surprise me. Nor does it surprise me that some plaintiffs have shown little interest in accessing businesses named in the claims their names were attached to. Most of us — able-bodied or not — only visit places we can get to, and where we’ll feel comfortable, and avoid places that don’t fit that category for so long they just drop off our internal map and out of our routine.
Labels: Media, Public Accommodations, Serial Litigation
Labels: Appellate Cases, Title II, Transportation
Although the media and the U.S. public focused primarily on the minimum-coverage requirement, or individual mandate, during the recent oral arguments in the challenges to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) before the Supreme Court, the most important issue before the Court may well be the constitutionality of the ACA's Medicaid expansion. There are potential alternatives to the minimum-coverage requirement, but a finding that the Medicaid expansion is unconstitutional could threaten all federal spending programs that set minimum participation standards. Indeed, as Justice Stephen Breyer observed during the oral argument, if the plaintiff's argument is accepted, then “Medicaid has been unconstitutional since 1964.”
Labels: Supreme Court
Fairview Developmental Center in Costa Mesa, Calif., is a sprawling facility of offices, residential buildings and therapy rooms set between a noisy boulevard and a golf course.
Some 400 people with developmental disabilities live at Fairview. And while minor scratches and bruises are not uncommon for these patients, over the years, the center has seen scores of serious injuries and even deaths.
Fairview is one of five state-run developmental centers in California — homes for people with developmental disabilities who are unable to care for themselves.
An investigation by member station KQED and the nonprofit group California Watch has uncoveredpatterns of abuse at a number of these institutions, including Fairview.
Owners and managers of swimming pools at hotels, city recreation centers and public parks are scrambling to install mechanical chair lifts to comply with new federal requirements that all public pools be accessible to disabled swimmers.
Some hotels fear the cost of the equipment or fines for noncompliance could put them out of business, and an industry lobbyist says others may close their pools this summer if they can’t upgrade in time, though the government can offer more time to those having trouble paying for it. Swimmers with disabilities say the changes are overdue.
“I couldn’t get into the pool without it,” said Karyn Kitchen of Savannah, who has multiple sclerosis and relies on a poolside chair lift at the Chatham County Aquatic Center for her physical therapy workouts up to four times a week.
If you accept the ADA's premise, which is that the government should force business owners to bear the cost of making the world more navigable for disabled people, you should be grateful to lawyers like Weitz for helping enforce that rule. More than two decades after the law was passed, Weitz is rooting out violators and making them comply, all at no cost to taxpayers.
Labels: Media, Public Accommodations, Serial Litigation, Title III
Labels: Media, Public Accommodations, Serial Litigation, Title III
A Statement from Secretary Sebelius on the Administration for Community Living
All Americans – including people with disabilities and seniors – should be able to live at home with the supports they need, participating in communities that value their contributions – rather than in nursing homes or other institutions.
The Obama administration and my department have long been committed to promoting community living and finding new mechanisms to help ensure that the supports people with disabilities and seniors need to live in the community are accessible.
Today, with the creation of the new Administration for Community Living (ACL), we are reinforcing this commitment by bringing together key HHS organizations and offices dedicated to improving the lives of those with functional needs into one coordinated, focused and stronger entity.
The Administration for Community Living will bring together the Administration on Aging, the Office on Disability and the Administration on Developmental Disabilities into a single agency that supports both cross-cutting initiatives and efforts focused on the unique needs of individual groups, such as children with developmental disabilities or seniors with dementia. This new agency will work on increasing access to community supports and achieving full community participation for people with disabilities and seniors.
The Administration on Community Living will seek to enhance and improve the broad range of supports that individuals may need to live with respect and dignity as full members of their communities. These support needs go well beyond health care and include the availability of appropriate housing, employment, education, meaningful relationships and social participation.
Building on President Obama’s Year of Community Living, the ACL will pursue improved opportunities for older Americans and people with disabilities to enjoy the fullest inclusion in the life of our nation.
For more information, please visit http://hhs.gov/aclAn important step, but, as they say, the proof is in the pudding. The question is whether this new agency can play an effective role in both promoting state community living initiatives and ensuring that CMS uses its very powerful fiscal leverage to support community living.
Labels: Community Treatment
A federal judge on Thursday approved a settlement meant to guarantee alternatives to segregation for mentally ill inmates in Massachusetts prisons.
The settlement results from a lawsuit filed in 2007 by an advocacy group. It sought to stop Massachusetts from placing mentally ill inmates with disciplinary problems in small isolation cells for up to 23 hours a day, saying that doing so violated their constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Labels: Mental Health, Prisons, Psychiatric Disabilities
A U.S. District Court of Colorado judge on Monday certified a nationwide class-action suit brought against a national clothing retailer by a Denver attorney.
Judge Wiley Daniel had already ruled “the center front entrances [with steps] at the Hollister stores at Park Meadows mall and Orchard Town Center mall violate the Americans with Disabilities Act.”
The ruling means the lawsuit now covers Hollister stores across the United States, not just those in Colorado.
Labels: Class Actions, Public Accommodations, Title III
Resources for Human Development, Inc. (RHD), doing business as Family House of Louisiana, a treatment facility for chemically dependent women and their children, will pay $125,000 to settle a disability discrimination suit filed in September 2010 by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency announced today.
The court-approved settlement resolves the charge of Lisa Harrison, who worked as a prevention / intervention specialist at RHD’s Family House facility in Louisiana from 1999 until she was fired in September of 2007. In its suit, the EEOC charged that RHD violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) when it fired Harrison because of her disability, severe obesity, even though she was able to perform the essential functions of her job. Before the EEOC filed suit, Harrison died.
During the litigation, the court denied both of the defendant’s motions for summary judgment in an order holding that severe obesity is an impairment within the meaning of the ADA. EEOC v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2011 WL 6091560 (E.D. La. Dec. 2011) (“severe obesity qualifies as a disability under the ADA”). The court concluded that severe obesity may qualify as a disability regardless of whether it is caused by a physiological disorder, rejecting RHD’s argument to the contrary.
Labels: EEOC, Employment, Obesity
Labels: Appellate Cases, Employment
The medical-versus-social model binary is therefore a poor way of distinguishing between autism's factions. Far from distinguishing the two sides in the autism debate, the medical-versus-social model binary suggests that both parents and the neurodiverse seek the same thing: an end to disability, albeit through very different means. Furthermore, although the two sides clash over the pursuit of cures and certain treatments for autism, those policy choices are dependent on moral frameworks--not disability's dueling models of causation. And lastly, although both models of disability agree that impairment is inevitable, this turns out to be precisely what parents and the neurodiverse do not agree about.
The real fight within the autism community has to do with autism's essence, but the hard-and-fast distinction between impairment's biological core and people's experience of impairment is illusory. Given the recent amendments to the definition of disability under the ADA, which defines disability as an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” the meaning of impairment is now more salient than ever.
A recent second wave of disabilities studies suggests that impairment, like disability, is constructed by the social practices and institutions that name and diagnose it. This is true so far as it goes, but the autism debate suggests another way that impairment is constructed: it is constructed not only by those who name it but also by those who are named--autistic people, themselves. The neurodiversity movement, which claims autism as a way of being, is neither quaint nor quackery. It underscores that part of autism is the experience of those who are classified as having autism and who are changed by being so classified. For them, autism is a part of their being, not--or not only--some as of yet unknown biological pathology. Moreover, by adapting to, resisting, and transforming the social practices and institutions that classify them, autistic people change autism. Autism, like other impairments, is therefore not fixed; its meaning is evolving as the group denoted by the diagnosis changes.
Although many legal scholars have articulated the distinction between the social and medical models of disability and between impairment and disability, few have scrutinized the assumptions upon which these binaries are based. That is the purpose of this Article. Using autism as a case study, this Article attempts to show that the oft-claimed binary between the social model of disability (which holds that disability is socially constructed) and the medical model of disability (which holds that it is not) is not as stark as it is often made out to be, and that impairment is not solely biological but instead socially constructed, in part, by those who are diagnosed. Although these conclusions do not make peace between autism's dueling sides, they help to explain how the sides disagree “and why, perhaps, the twain shall never meet.”
Labels: Autism, Recent Scholarship
A tenant leader at Soundview Houses is fuming over the city’s refusal to work with her to make the complex handicapped-accessible.
Mary McGee, the tenant association president, says she can’t leave her building or even check her mail alone since a recent surgery temporarily confined her to a wheelchair. Two steps in the lobby, between the elevators and the front door, strand her inside unless neighbors lift her over them.
”I’m a prisoner in my own home,” the petite and typically energetic woman said Wednesday.
Charter schools and special education for disabled students are based on conflicting education reforms and agency oversight principles. Charter schools operate in a culture of regulatory freedom and flexibility. They arose out of the modern era of accountability reform, in which student outcomes are the primary measure of school success and the driving engine of agency oversight. In stark contrast, special education laws were conceived in the civil rights era of education reform, which emphasized process and paid little attention to outcomes. The education of disabled students is steeped in a culture of regulatory oversight focused on rigid compliance with complex procedures. Special education and charter schools stand on competing foundations in the same schoolhouse. The Article discusses this culture clash and the consequences to disabled students. The uncomfortable fit between charter schools and special education often leads to violations of disabled students' civil rights. The Article suggests how the three primary sources of law affecting charter schools--federal law, state law, and charter agreements--should be changed to achieve a seamless fit of charter schools' square peg into special education's round hole for the benefit of disabled students.
Labels: Education, IDEA, Recent Scholarship
Labels: Education, Recent Scholarship, Sports
The U.S. Department of Education this month took back an offer it made to school districts last summer that would have let them cut special education spending permanently, with only a one-time penalty, and for reasons other than existing exemptions in federal disability education law.As Justice Frankfurter said, wisdom too often never comes, so one ought not to reject it because it comes late. Kudos to the Department of Education for changing its mind here.
Labels: Learning Disability
Labels: Appellate Cases, Community Treatment, Mental Health, Olmstead, Psychiatric Disabilities
Labels: Supreme Court
Labels: Community Treatment, Mental Health
Labels: Employment
Labels: Appellate Cases, Olmstead
Labels: Assisted Suicide
Labels: Employment, Psychiatric Disabilities
(1) the State's lack of ASL-fluent mental health practitioners; (2) the State's failure to reimburse medical providers for interpreting services; (3) the State's failure to provide deaf-appropriate group home care settings; and (4) the State's refusal to provide adequate funding for deaf services.The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on liability (both on their individual and their class claims), and the court granted the motion. The court concluded that the record established "as a matter of law that the named Plaintiffs have been denied the benefit of a State-provided mental health care service, group home living, in violation of the ADA." As to the class claims, the court pointed to unrebutted testimony "that the State currently faces a severe shortage of community living arrangements designed to accommodate the needs of the deaf"; that "the State faces a severe shortage of ASL-proficient practitioners," which "is a barrier to deaf consumers receiving adequate mental health care"; and that "the State's failure to reimburse health care providers for the cost of interpreters disincentives practitioners from serving deaf consumers, thereby exacerbating deaf consumers' lack of access to the State's mental health care services." The court ordered that the case be assigned to a magistrate judge for mediation to determine the appropriate remedy.
Labels: Community Treatment, Mental Health
Labels: Community Treatment, Mental Health, Olmstead, Psychiatric Disabilities
A state agency that looks out for the rights of people with disabilities is advocating for a proposed settlement that would shift the care of Virginians with intellectual disabilities from state-run institutions.
The Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy is asking a federal judge to approve the agreement, saying it will increase the safety of people who live in the state’s five training centers. The centers offer housing, therapy, medical care and other services for people with profound disabilities, and the agreement proposes to close four of them by 2020.
VOPA argues in its brief that the status quo puts those residents at risk of abuse, neglect, injury and death. The group also says that since 2007, it has investigated 184 injuries and deaths at training centers that it thinks were caused by abuse or neglect.
Labels: Community Treatment, Olmstead
Hundreds of movie screens in Illinois will be equipped with technology to help residents with hearing and vision disabilities under a settlement announced Wednesday by Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan.
As part of the settlement, Kansas City, Mo.-based AMC Theatres will provide personal captioning services and audio-description technology at all of its Illinois movie theaters, which include 460 movie screens. The services will be available by 2014 at nearly all theaters and at all listed showings.
Before the settlement, 21 of the 246 movie theaters in Illinois offered closed captioning and 10 offered audio description.
Labels: Public Accommodations, Title III
Labels: Employment, State Law
Labels: Public Accommodations, Serial Litigation, Title III
Advocacy groups, service providers and community mental health boards are joining to support a proposed agreement between Virginia and federal government to shift the care of people with intellectual disabilities away from state-run institutions.
The Arc of Virginia and its regional offices, community-based providers, and groups supporting Virginians with Down syndrome and autism have joined the statewide coalition. Other backers include the Virginia Association of Community Services Boards, the Virginia Association of Personal Care Assistants and the Virginia Poverty Law Center.
Labels: Community Treatment, Olmstead
Labels: Community Treatment, Mental Health, Olmstead, Psychiatric Disabilities
Labels: Budget Cuts
The Justice Department statement said "the settlement requires Trinity to pay $198,000 to aggrieved individuals and a $20,000 civil penalty; provide training to hospital staff on the requirements of the ADA; and adopt specific policies and procedures to ensure that auxiliary aids and services are promptly provided to patients or companions who are deaf or hard of hearing."
Labels: Title III
Labels: Community Treatment, Mental Health, Olmstead, Psychiatric Disabilities
Labels: Employment, Insurance